

ISBN 978-86-89111-23-1



LEARNING
ARCHITECTURE

PROCEEDINGS

**CHAPTER 1 INNOVATION IN ART, ARCHITECTURE, SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE DIGITAL AGE**

**CHAPTER 2 INNOVATION IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY –
– IMPROVED USE AND USER EXPERIENCE**

**CHAPTER 3 INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS AND LEARNING
IN METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND DESIGN**

**CHAPTER 4 MODELING FUTURE ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS**

**CHAPTER 5 CHALLENGES IN ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN DESIGN –
– FACING THE CLIMATE CRISIS, SUSTAINABLE PRACTICES**

CHAPTER 6 ART OR ARCHITECTURE AS INSPIRATION

POSTER SESSION

ON ARCHITECTURE
LEARNING ARCHITECTURE
PROCEEDINGS

Belgrade, Serbia
2020

ON ARCHITECTURE
LEARNING ARCHITECTURE
PROCEEDINGS

- CHAPTER 1 **Innovation in Art, Architecture, Science and Technology
in The Digital Age**
- CHAPTER 2 **Innovation in Information Technology – Improved Use
and User Experience**
- CHAPTER 3 **Innovative Solutions and Learning
in Methodological Approach and Design**
- CHAPTER 4 **Modeling Future Architecture and Design
with Environmental and Social Implications**
- CHAPTER 5 **Challenges in Architecture and Urban Design –
– Facing the Climate Crisis, Sustainable Practices**
- CHAPTER 6 **Art or Architecture as Inspiration**
- POSTER SESSION

IMPRESSUM

Title

ON ARCHITECTURE
LEARNING ARCHITECTURE
Proceedings

Publisher

STRAND - Sustainable Urban Society Association
Belgrade, Serbia

Acting on behalf of the Publisher

Ružica Bogdanović
STRAND - Sustainable Urban Society Association

Editor

Ružica Bogdanović

Reviewers

Aleksandra Stupar
Nataša Danilović Hristić
Nora Lefa
Ranka Gajić
Svetlana Batarilo
Ružica Bogdanović

Belgrade, 2020

ISBN 978-86-89111-23-1

CONTENTS

Preface

CHAPTER 1 Innovation in Art, Architecture, Science and Technology in The Digital Age

Material Contours: Architecture as Territory

Mitesh Dixit

From Flux Space to Flux Space 4.0

Renate Weissenböck, Ruth Ron

Document vs. Model Based Digital Design Process

Igor Svetel

Digital Design in A Millennia-Old Perspective

Pavlos Lefas

CHAPTER 2 Innovation in Information Technology – Improved Use and User Experience

System Architect: Digital Literacy and Construction of the Space/Environment for Research Operations

Dragana Cirić

Methodology of Hybridization in Architecture: Elementality Readings in Axonometric Drawings

Ivana Lovrinčević, Hristina Stojanović

Transforming the City in the Digital Era

The Information Technologies as A Tool of Collaborative Design

Ouggrinis Konstantinos-Alketas, Kyriakopoulou Anastasia-Maria

CHAPTER 3 Innovative Solutions and Learning in Methodological Approach and Design

Learning Architecture Focusing on the Importance of the Relationship Between the Architect-Theorist and The Architect-Creator

Vladan Djokić

Reality Greater Than Reality: Shakespeare at the End of Architectural Studies

Vladimir Milenković

Learning Through Collaborations in Architectural Education Pedagogical and Methodological Aspects in Design Studio Course

Marija Mano Velevska, Slobodan Velevski, Divna Penchikj

Learning from Bauhaus: Revisiting Experiential Learning in the Age of Digital Fabrication

Ioanna Symeonidou

Architecture as A Part of A New Culture of Learning

Dragana Vasilski

Custom, Custom-, Customize

Aleksa Bijelović

Practices of Teaching First Year Design in Architecture

Nora Lefa

Integrating Learning City Concept Within Urban Design Studio

Danijela Milovanović Rodić, Marija Maruna, Aleksandra Milovanović, Branislav Antonić, Višnja Sretović Brković

**CHAPTER 4 Modeling Future Architecture and Design
with Environmental and Social Implications**

Specific Incompleteness: Unleashing the Potential
Mila Mojsilović

The Empty Concept: (Sur)Realism of the Virtual
Snežana Vesnić

Embodying Space
A Dialogue Between Architecture and Body
Saimir Kristo, Xhoana Kristo

**The Image of The Port-City of The Mediterranean as a Connection Between Cultural Heritage and
Port Infrastructures: The Drapetsona (Attica Prefecture, Greece) Case Study**
Alexios Tzompanakis, Alessandro Lanzetta

Two Zagreb by the River
Denis Ambruš, Vlatko Dusparić

Examining Contradiction: New Possibilities for Planning Large Scale Infrastructure Projects
Ina Valkanova

**CHAPTER 5 Challenges in Architecture and Urban Design – Facing the Climate Crisis,
Sustainable Practices**

**Results of Scientific Research Project „The Spatial, Environmental, Energy and Social Aspects of
Developing Settlements and Climate Change – Mutual Impacts “– Facing the Climate Crisis,
Proposals and Solutions in Newer Planning Practice in Serbia**
Mila Pucar, Marina Nenковиć – Riznić

CHAPTER 6 Art or Architecture as Inspiration

Is there such a Thing as an Amateur Architect?
Thanasis Moutsopoulos

The Art in the Development of Modern Park Composition
Vaska Sandeva, Katerina Despot

State of Metamorphosis
Nikola Lajić

POSTER SESSION

Endless Corner
Riift Studio

Public Art
Nikola Rajaković, Marko Oršolić (Polimorf)

Jamais-Déjà Vu
Andrea Raičević

AUTHOR INDEX

PREFACE

The theme of the 8th International Conference ON ARCHITECTURE, entitled LEARNING ARCHITECTURE follows the basic concept realized and developed at previous conferences of a multidisciplinary approach to the topic of architecture. Whilst extending research and the importance of understanding architecture the Conference theme is exploring UNESCO Learning City platform. Starting from the seventeen sustainable development goals, in particular making cities and human settlements inclusive, secure, resilient and sustainable, the role of architecture is considered as the basic artifact of urban structure. In all important aspects to understand the contemporary city and the processes that determine it, to consider the position and role of architecture and urban design, as well as the contribution of art and science, through the analysis of best practice that advance the life of the city.

Some key themes that interest the organisers and Programme Committees are:

- Best practices - learning city revitalizes learning in communities, extends the use of modern learning technologies and fosters a culture of learning throughout life
- Modeling the Future - modeling future architecture and design with environmental and social implications,
- Smart Design - in architecture, urban design, street and home furniture, lighting
- Technology and Architecture - how the use of digital technologies transforms the work process (BIM)
- Scientific research and architectural practice
- Innovative solutions in methodological approach and design in the use of materials
- Art as inspiration
- Playing City - gamification in urban design and town planning,
- Innovation in art, architecture, science, and technology in the digital age
- Innovation in information technology - improved use and user experience
- Challenges in Architecture and Urban Design - Facing the Climate Crisis, Sustainable Practices

Editor

THE EMPTY CONCEPT: (SUR)REALISM OF THE VIRTUAL

Snežana Vesnić

University of Belgrade – Faculty of Architecture
snegene@arh.bg.ac.rs

ABSTRACT

This dual title refers to the very production of and with the architectural concept. The technology of translating the architectural object from one form of existence into another, in successive and simultaneous projections, comprises the hyper-specificity of the methodology of the architectural project. '(Sur)Realism of the Virtual' indicates a possibility for a different understanding of the terms "virtual" and "realism" in the sense of destabilizing the "reality of the virtual" and introducing the *novel* into the very notion of the virtual. René Magritte explicitly demonstrated that the object never matches its projection, just as words do not match the text they explain. (Sur)Realism of the virtual refers to my idea of creating a new conceptual potential at the point of absence, lack or inexistence of the architectural object.

In thematizing actualization or realization of the empty concept, I follow the ideas of Thomas Aquinas that all substances seek their own perfection and everything is directed towards *their final end: a fully realized state of existence or actuality*. A virtual field represents the necessary conditions under which *real* experience is *actualized*, such that actualization and the object belong to the virtual. All these relations explain processes of production of the architectural object and show nearly mathematically the differences among the modalities of *the object's* reality across diverse status: potential, act, movement, and force.

THE QUESTION OF TRANSGRESSION: OBJECT / CONCEPT

Let me begin with my thesis that the architectural concept is an object of reality and the subject of illusion, and that architecture is the art of creating concepts and of creation by concept (Vesnić, 2020). Presently, I would like to document some reflections on creative processes, in order to explain the creation and life (different existences) of the architectural object. It is a matter of layering and complexity of the architectural understanding of the architect's processes, acts, gestures, and documents that produce the object of architecture. In philosophy as in architecture, there is an odd, constantly re-examined connection between the concept and (its) object. By simultaneously projecting the "concept of the object" and "objectivization of the concept," my aim is to deconstruct their existences and conditions in which their appearance is possible. In this methodological reconstruction of the architectural project, I want to explain that creation of new concepts is the condition of creation of the "new" in architectural theory and practice.

In order to show the relation of the concept to the creation of the "new," I have put forward two structures: 1) a system I call "modalities of reality," and 2) forms of "existence" of objects. Constructing systems of "modalities of reality" and forms of "existence" of objects, and by deconstructing both the term 'virtual', I introduce a *fourth form* of existence of the architectural object – an absence of presence, which I name the (*sur*)realism of the virtual. (more in Vesnić, *Times and Technology of the Architectural Concept*; Torino, Lecture 2019, forthcoming).

The architectural object, as object of specific philosophy and aesthetics, constantly transgressing both its presence and absence, can be understood in the changes to form of its existence. These include both the processes of appearance and design that precede its actualization in the reality of form of its existence. Matters become more complicated when we introduce the question what is 'reality' framed by the 'present/absent'. Further, what are these *other* modalities of existence or forms of reality that "exist" and in which the architectural object "exists?" (At present, for the various forms of existence, I will use the word "reality.")

Clearly, "two" or more "existences" of the object comprise a single *totality* or a single "whole" we call the architectural object (that which is present is most easily explained through the aesthetic projection and "absence"). Asymmetry of "appearance" (that which is present materializes the absent and vice versa) allows for the architectural object to lose the possibility of comprehensive interpretation and ultimate explanation. Apart from that, "the objectivity of the object cannot be compared to a constant entity. It is characterised by all manner of fractures and what it presents is this fragility, this instability and contingency" (Steinweg, 2014: 42). Actually, the object and its objectivizations are transient, since absence allows for the openness of the object for further readings and shifts. If we used at this point Peter Eisenman's explanation that absence always implies a transfer from the domain of the senses into the domain of the intellect, yet that there is nevertheless a *hidden but present reality of an object in its own presence*, then we can show that there is a whole range of transfers and acts through which the existence of the architectural object takes place.

In order to fully explain the existence of the object, Eisenman introduces another condition to complement the relation presence/absence – "presentness:"

"(...) deconstruction of the presence/absence dialectic is inadequate for architecture precisely because architecture is not two-term, but a three-term system. In architecture, there is another condition, which I call presentness, that is neither absence nor presence, form nor function, neither particular use of sign nor the crude existence of reality, but rather an excessive condition between sign and the Heideggerian notion of being..." (Bojanic, Djokic, 2017: 13)

Eisenman is here attempting to explain an absence that "exists" in presence, and that the only permanent truth about entity is that it is not an entity in itself, and therefore contains a present absence of entity. Although absence is explained through presence, and although presence contains absence, the "existence" of the object requires also a "third state" or "presentness," which is really the presence of absence. Eisenman locates in presentness what he calls the "aura in architecture." "I believe that by virtue of architecture's unique relationship to presence, to what I call presentness, it will always be a domain of aura. After all, aura is presence of absence, the possibility of a presentness of something else." (Eisenman, 2007: 4)

Generally, architectural objectivization structures and deconstructs complex forms of reality through presences, absences, and present absences. Even through dissolution of presence. The object is never a constant entity, and so its reality is transient. Changes and transitions from various "states" or modalities

of reality explain the life of the object of architecture and its complex existence. Therefore, the architectural project is a process of projections and transformations from one shape to another, one form into another, one technique into another – if you will, from one document to another.

FORMS OF REALITY: (de)CONSTRUCTION OF EXISTENCE

To elaborate these processes of translation and projection, I will reconstruct the terms that explain the modalities of reality and then construct a system in which I can explain the conceptualization as a process of simultaneous and continuous projections (presences and absences) across the architectural project.

Starting with Aristotle's duality of *dunamis* and *energeia*, introducing Hegel's distinction between *Realität* and *Wirklichkeit*, and further nuances between *Wirklich* and *Wirken*, as well as Duns Scotus' variations, I make a distinction between the real and reality. For Hegel, *Realität* was close to mere existence or "objective reality." *Realität* – the real – is pure, brute fact, "simple appearance." *Wirklichkeit* – "actuality" – on the other hand, is seen as actual, effective reality (that which emerges as a consequence of action on *Realität*). It is the effect and independent actuality, which once produced is capable of generating effects of its own. Hegel further differentiates between the terms *Wirklich* and *Wirken*. The former designated the actual, while the latter was what was active and can draw on effectiveness and act. In the case of the verb, *Wirken* – meaning action or activity, as well as to work and to act on – it is the basis for understanding the terms action and reaction, having an effect, being effective. What is important here is that each actualization implies two things, effect and further action or act or further acting.

Hegel's term *Wirklichkeit* aligns with Aristotle's term "*energeia*." Aristotle set up the duality *dunamis* and *energeia* (in Latin, *potentia* and *actus*). The Latin *actualis* is analogous to *reality*, that is, the German *Wirklichkeit*. Thus, in Latin, the distinction *potential* and *actus* is used to translate the Aristotelian distinction between *dunamis* and *energeia*, presenting the difference between potential and act. These dualisms indicate that on the one hand there is "potentiality" (*dynamis*) that is opposed to "actuality" (*Wirklichkeit*, *energeia*). Moreover, *dunamis* designates both "potentiality" as 1) the "not yet of the act" and 2) "power" that results from it. Latin expresses this difference through the terms *potential* and *potestas*, which translate to the English *dynamic* and *power*. Throughout these gradations, potentiality can become not the absence of the act, but rather its eminent quality which makes the act a work.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECT: LA VIRTUALITÉ (RENFERME) L'ACTE.

In this system of "modalities of reality," I have set up three plans that (a) define the duality "potentiality" and "actuality," (b) "actuality" and "reality," and (c) the plane of the "actual" and "virtual." I have done so to present the acting and generation of the object of architecture through these modalities of reality. The actual is defined, throughout a broad spectrum, in the following way: "the actual" is understood as *existing in act or reality, not just potentially, really acted or acting*. "The real" means *true, genuine, not merely nominal or apparent or the real is that which can be characterized as a confirmation of truth*, while *effect or expression of something* depends on the capacity or contingency of the act itself; and "virtual" is what possesses all the conditions for actualization, or what exists without manifesting, what has not yet become actual through the act.

From a Deleuzian perspective, both the actual and the virtual are fully real. Although the former (unlike the latter) has concrete existence, it is no more real for that fact. Deleuze explains the importance of this distinction thus: this distinction can exist only in our heads or on paper, "(...) but its effects are fully real and may also be fully actual too." This is very similar to the definition of virtual as that which possesses all the conditions for actualization (but is not actual). (Deleuze, 1994: 208–9)

Aside from that, this difference (of actual and virtual) becomes important in the field of architecture because it enables to see or experience something that is still real, even if it is not actual. This means that when we have an idea, it is indeed real and possesses all the conditions for actualization, but is not actual until we conceptualize it, initiate it, place it in action. Further, for Deleuze, "a virtual field represents the necessary conditions under which *real* experience is *actualised*," (Esposito, digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br) such that actualization and the object belong to the virtual. (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007: 149) All these fragile relations explain processes of the architectural project and show the differences among the modalities of reality across diverse statuses: potential, act, movement, and force.

The virtual is not an imitation of reality, but a separate ontological state. For Deleuze, who practically develops Peirce's conception, being virtual is being real without necessarily being actual. However, "architecturally" more significant is the idea Peirce borrowed from Scotus in which the term "virtual"

contains “another:” “No object will produce a simple and proper concept of itself and a simple and proper concept of another object unless it contains this second object essentially or virtually.” (Scotus, 1987: 23) The idea according to which the virtual contains the other, or the possibility, potential or contingency of the *other* is crucial for architectural production. Creating, the production of concepts or objects of architecture is conditioned by the presence of the future (other) in the course of creation. This allows the virtual, not only through hypothetical models, simulations or imitations of reality, but deconstruction of presence and absence of objects and their projections. There is a conceptual creation of ever new potential in the place of potency exhaustion of the actual, for further movements and actions of architectural production.

OVER PERFECTION

Architecture is a discipline in which any creation is directed at the perfection of form or some kind of ideality, or else everything tends to be temporarily suspended in perfection. According to Thomas Aquinas, all substances seek their own perfection and everything is directed towards its final end, which is a fully realized state of existence or actuality. On the other hand, aside from actualization or realization, we also find in Aquinas the idea of duration in the sense of repetition, examination, or else. Following Aristotle, Aquinas emphasize that living things are composites of matter and substantial form and that substance cannot achieve (own) final end without exercising the powers it has in virtue of its substantial form. The emphasis is less on the “final end” itself than on the capacities and powers to actualize perfection. Although in architecture (self-) completion in perfection means the complete actualization of the object, its specific capacities, and powers to perform the activity of the concept, above all there must be the capacity and conditions for actualization. And a further requirement is that there be an act, an activity, a movement that would transmute (transfer, translate?) *something* from pure potential into the actual. Aquinas’ *Summa Theologiae* contains a passage that explains the concept of “first principles of action:”

“Respondeo dicendum quod virtus nominat quandam potentiae perfectionem. Uniuscuiusque autem perfectio praecipue consideratur in ordine ad suum finem. Finis autem potentiae actus est. Unde potentia dicitur esse perfecta, secundum quod determinatur ad suum actum. Sunt autem quaedam potentiae quae secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad suos actus; sicut potentiae naturales activae.”

“Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing’s perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.” (Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Question 94, Second Article Reply Obj. 2, 1096. q. 55 a. 1 co.)

What is important to note in this passage is the ‘perfection of power’ (*potentiae perfectionem*), denoted by virtue, but that the end or exhaustion of power is in the act. This means that the capacity of power is determined by the act. If we recall that the virtual is that which possesses all the conditions for actualization, or what exists without manifesting, and that virtual precedes actualization, then the virtual has the power to transform the “realities” subsumed within it, while maintaining the state of potential, the “not yet of the act,” keeping it from completely actualizing. The problem occurs due to the power of the virtual to exhaust itself, while actualization itself implies the end of power.

The power of the architectural concept, which is what lies at the base of explanations of intentionality toward the object, is to simultaneously transform the primary visual and sensory experience along with the mental one. The virtual is the location of the conceptual transformation of potential. The concept engages the virtual in order to materialize (precisely through the virtual) its own *absence* in the future present – the actual. In that sense, the virtual is an instrument of the concept, a technique and technology for production of the future architectural object. The concept’s creative power comes first from the capacity to engender, to encompass and unify into a whole; further, through the materiality of the object, it can virtualize absence; and finally, through its projections into the real object, it can direct the constitution and meaning of the object of architecture.

PRESENTNESS . (...) AND ABSENT(NESS) OF THE ARCHITECTURAL OBJECT

What then is the “possible reality” of the architectural object? What is the status of possible reality? Is this also a kind of reality, or only a possibility? What is the ontological status of the concept of presence within the object? Is it only potentially present within or does it “act,” producing a given reality?

Possibilities, then, have some sort of reality of their own, although it sounds paradoxical, and contradicts Bergson. These are not “only” possibilities. But the issue is not simply the actualization of the possible, which would reduce it through action and realization, simply exhausting given potential. In the virtual, actuality and potentiality are inextricably intertwined because the virtual is some kind of open form of potentiality that also contains the possibilities of its actualization.

Thus, the virtual is not mere present absence, that is, the reality of absence – which would be Deleuze’s and Eisenman’s interpretation. The virtual is that which is placed into action through conceptualization. It is not only Eisenman’s presentness, but the possibility of always being other, the actualization of the *other* before the actualization of the architectural object and the virtualization of the “possible” – the creation of new potential. The possibility of maintaining potential in actualization, or against Bergson, (Deleuze, 1988: 96) that there is a moment when the possible is real – this is the contingency of the ideal object of architecture or the perfection grounded in Aquinas’ determination. Bergson made a careful distinction: *the possible* is the opposite to and of the real, which means that possible is not “possible” as part of the real, nor is the virtual the actual, but as such possess a reality. The virtual does not have to be realized but rather actualized. The possible has no reality because it can also not take place. (Bergson, 1922) The real realizes while the virtual actualizes, meaning produces effect. The virtual always materializes a difference – potential and actual, the real and reality, intellect and appearance. Finally, in order for a difference to be constructed, there must be an act, acting, patent conceptual transformation that would turn one form of existence into another.

In *Palladio Virtual*, Eisenman differentiates among three states or definitions of the virtual. First: “The virtual refers to architectural relationships that are implied by a condition of presence but that exist beyond the literal or the ideal.” Further, “The virtual is both an excessive and a normative condition, because it too can be considered only a hypothetical version of something. This could be said to be a second condition of the virtual.” And third, “The reality of (Palladio’s) work therefore exists between the drawings and the buildings themselves, as a virtual Palladio ...” (Eisenman, Roman, 2015: 66) What can we glean from these sentences? Eisenman uses ‘virtual’ as simple technique or method to show that technology is its own historical grounding, and that this is the very condition for understanding the potential of Palladio’s project. However, it seems that such a systematization of the potential of the object, between analytical models and geometry, the ideal and virtual diagram, is also a demonstration that Eisenman’s “presentness” is still inadequate to explain the existence of the architectural object.

(SUR)REALISM OF THE VIRTUAL

Two important questions tied to architectural creation were opened by Aquinas. The first is whether creation is *ex nihilo*: “if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made;” and second, when “something” reaches its own perfection. Following Aquinas, each creation presumes change: “But to be made is to be changed. Therefore creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of what is in potentiality.” Change that allows conceptual transition from potential into actualization, from the virtual to the actual, reflects various forms of presence as well as absence of the architectural concept, thus ensuring the concept’s existence beyond its spatial and temporal referentiality. This is also Bergson’s position in which temporality (our possibility of change and movement) also ensures spatiality and dynamic – the movement of the creative act.

The architectural object, which although it has an immediate aesthetic and function, represented in its presence, never exists as a thing in itself and never entirely overlaps with its materialization; it forever points to its own absence. However, undoubtedly, the architectural object is tied and belongs to the category of existence, and through its actualization gives all other forms of existence: “(...) everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing.” (Aquiunski, q.5. (I:3:4; I:4:1). Actuality, as that which is in relation with the real – *the present is what passes and defines the actual* – carries the capacity for new changes. (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007: 148-166) Deleuze’s understanding of actuality is tied to the concept of possibility: reality unfolds and detaches from its potential. Architecture is not interested in the potential that never will or can turn into the purely actual (such *potential* is, after all, contradictory from the off). The idea actualized in a thought or object can only be comprehensively understood if we also include its virtual aspect. When the object’s absence is “materialized,” its virtual presence is the realism of an as of yet inexistent object beyond all actualization. I explain this as “the fourth state of existence of the object,” one which is conceptually important for the creation and existence of the architectural object – the (*sur*)realism of the virtual. Traversing the path from potential, as the possible, moving from the real to actual, determining the time actualization, the concept always projects (much like the projection) a new modality

of reality. Following Eisenman, I would call the (*sur*)realism of the virtual the “absence of presence” and explain it in the following fashion: 1) in the course of conceptualization, there are moments when reality of the possible as an emptiness or “absence” of the future object will be permanently built in; 2) after the materialization of the object it will be built into the potential of its own dematerialization. This is emptiness, its own absence in reality, continuity of the object in the surreality of the virtual. This is the life of the concept through maintaining the “object” as never fully actualized, and allowing that the possibility of difference between virtual and actual be once again encompassed conceptually – which is the creation of the new architectural concept.

THE EMPTY CONCEPT: “NO X IS Φ ” [$\forall x \sim \Phi x$]

All these processes of translating “objective existence” would be entirely clear if absence only had one form. Kant, however, differentiates between various forms of non-presence or “the absential.” Immediately prior to the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the final pages of the “Transcendental Analytic,” Kant is wrapping up his analysis of four categories of “nothing” (*Nichts*). These are 1) “Empty concept without object,” – *ens rationis* or *Leerer Begriff ohne Gegenstand*, 2) “Empty object of a concept” – *nihil privativum* or *Leerer Gegenstand eines Begriffs*, 3) “Empty intuition without an object,” – *ens imaginarium* or *Leere Anschauung ohne Gegenstand*, and 4) “Empty object without concept,” – *nihil negativum* or *Leerer Gegenstand ohne Begriff*. (Johnston, 2019: 196-198)

One of the most widely-quoted sentences of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (A51/B76). (Kant, 1998: 50) We can substitute thoughts with concept, and that they have not been “supplied” with perception, that is, that they have no objective reality. In line with Kant’s idea, this refers above all to those concepts that cannot be supplied with perception (are impossible) – a rather delicate place in the text where we should be rather careful. 1) This also appears in considerations about nothing as *ens rationis* – an empty concept without object. Simply put, the object of such a concept corresponds to no perception that could be referred to (that is, it is physically impossible for our perceptive capacity). In contrast to this, there is an empty object without concept (*nihil negativum*), that is, a contradiction. These two should be carefully differentiated, otherwise, an appropriate concept cannot be created in the latter case, while in the former there is no appropriate perception. In the second case, concept = nothing, while in the first the object = nothing. 2) In a different way, empty concepts are provisionally also ideas of the mind, since no perception can be assigned to them as concepts (such as infinity, freedom, etc.).

Kant then connects the *ens rationis* with the universal negative (no x is Φ “[$\forall x \sim \Phi x$]) in logical quantification. This directs us to an empty concept without object, the concept of “nothing” in the sense of conceptual determination of the very absence or non-presence of any applicable object. That is to say, no-object *als Gegenstand*, that is a no-object of spatial-temporal phenomenal experience. It is important that the other three categories in Kant’s categorization are actually phenomenological, as we are discussing phenomenal objects. An empty concept can be interpreted as pure conceptual potential for the creation of object outside predefined experiential conditions. The idea that outside phenomenological projection we expect an object that surpasses its own reality as well as its own virtuality is an idea of an empty concept that can accept an architectural concept without its corresponding object.

As opposed to the “authentic” concept, the “empty concept” (which has a history from Kant to Sartre) refers to something fictitious that has no corresponding “reality” (Bojanić and Cherepanova, 2020: 135). This fictional that evades reality (whether actual or virtual) is the incommensurability of conceptual potential. When Deleuze explains the virtual as a physical modality with the fact that he explicitly contrasts virtuality and possibility (following Bergson’s lead), he is gesturing towards a virtuality as a vital component of the objective world. The empty concept is the possibility of thinking the architectural object outside its phenomenological projection. Surrealism that will fall within the empty concept indicates the possibility of superior reality of certain forms (of the object) in the destabilized reality of appearances or the appearance of reality. (*Sur*)Realism of the virtual is the state of always altered reality for the creation of a new conceptual potential at the point of total absence, lack or inexistence of the architectural object. It is the virtual that resists both the real and the actual: above the virtual and against the real.

However, the power of the virtual lies in its drive towards actuality. Bergson spoke rightly about finalism that would focus on reality as *producer of effects through which it is expanded and surpasses itself* (Bergson, 1997: 40, 60). Thus, creation assumes that the consequences cannot be given in advance, and that they creatively and from within surpass the causes. From the point of time, this means that there are only various paths of life, tendencies as dynamic and creative processes with the aim of continuous renewal of life, essential complementing of what is absent.

To this end, we must differentiate between the object as complete and the object as whole: what is complete is only an ideal part of the object. What is missing from the complete is a slew of relations that belong to actual existence. For the object to be whole and complete, it must contain a series of various existences, and it must be continuously reconstructed by deconstructing the “real-unreal.” Put more simply, by materializing “objective incompleteness,” we project the missing absence for self-completion (perfection) in the object’s reality.

Each new modern conception of the object begins with a concept of its total absence, specifically with the empty concept. The concept of the object is generic and it is explained in functions of objectivization of various levels of reality, that is, through possible levels of objectivization and phenomenological projections. Escaping from “objective reality” (*objective Realität*), the object passes through various transcendental conditions (formal, material, general), defining modalities (possible, actual, virtual), and corresponding to the different concepts of “reality.” Each level successively eliminates its own existence by creating contingencies in its opposite: virtual in actual, potential in act, present in absent. The pathways of abstraction and fiction intertwine, while the empty concept is pure potentiality.

René Magritte explicitly demonstrated that the object never matches its projection, just as words do not match the text they explain, but also that there is an invisible content of the visible.

“Everything we see hides another thing, we always want to see what is hidden by what we see. There is an interest in that which is hidden and which the visible does not show us. This interest can take the form of a quite intense feeling, a sort of conflict, one might say, between the visible that is hidden and the visible that is present.” (Magritte. 1929: 32-33).

When the thought about an object without a visible object possibly appears in documented form (such as a drawing or text), then the intangible abstraction of the “physical” object becomes at once its functional and formal ability to produce the entirely “new” in the architectural project. The identification of all differences, tensions and mismatches of object projections is documented in the architectural project. Learning architecture means constructing “architecture” of learning: setting up the theoretical construction, new (metaphysical) conceptual steps and gestures that manifest the phenomenological imperative of architecture’s immediate givenness.

REFERENCES

- Aquinas, Aquinas (1265–1274). *Summa Theologica*. <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.html>
- Bergson, Henri (1959). *L'évolution créatrice*. Paris : Les Presses universitaires de France.
- Bergson, Henri (1922). *Matter and Memory*. New York, Macmillan Co.
- Bojanić, P. and E. S. Cherepanova (2020). Invention of the future in project-time. An imaginary "encounter" between Georg Simmel and Henri Bergson, and its significance for architecture , *Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Философия и конфликтология*, (36), 131-140.
- Bojanić, P. *Opening* (2017). In Bojanić, Djokić ed., *Peter Eisenamn. In dialogue with Architects and Philosophers*. Mimesis International.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1994). *Difference and Repetition*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles. (1988). *Bergsonism*. Zoone Books.
- Deleuze & Parnet (2007). *Dialogues II*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Eisenman, Peter (2007). *Written Into the Void: Selected Writings, 1990-2004*. Yale University Press.
- Eisenman, Peter and Matt Roman (2015). *Palladio Virtuel*. Yale University Press.
- Esposito J. “Virtuality.” Digital Encyclopedia of Charles S. Peirce (digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br).
- Kant, Immanuel (1998). *Critique of Pure Reason*. Cambridge University Press.
- Magritte, René (1929). Les mots et les images,” *La Révolution surréaliste*, No 12, 32-33.
- Scotus, J. D. (1987). “Man’s Natural Knowledge of God,” in *Philosophical Writings: A Selection* Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Steinweg, Marcus (2014). “What is an Object,” 2011, in *The Object*, ed. Antony Hudek. London: Whitechapel Gallery, Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Vesnić, Snezana (2020). *Architectural Concept: Object of Reality and Object of Illusion*. Novi Sad, Beograd: Akademska knjiga, IDESE.